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A SMILE, A FROWN, AND A FEW NEW WRINKLES:
THE CHANGING FACE OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE IRS
K. H. SHARP*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys who represent clients in federal tax cases must follow the
rules of professional responsibility, the Internal Revenue Code
[hereinafter I.R.C.], and restrictions imposed by the courts. I An
additional set of rules also governs their professional conduct: the
standards of practice before the Internal Revenue Service set forth in
Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations [hereinafter C.F.R.]. 2 These
rules also appear in what the tax bar has come to know with dubious
affection as "Circular 230."3 The attorney who only occasionally
represents clients before the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter
Service] may discover the full reach of the rules that govern tax practice
by surprise. Moreover, the Treasury Department's recent revisions to
Circular 2304 may come as an even bigger surprise to attorney-
practitioners who prepare tax returns or give advice regarding return
positions.
The revisions to Circular 230 bind practitioners who prepare returns
or give return advice to a standard of accuracy essentially equivalent to
the standard currently imposed by the return preparer penalty rules of
the I.R.C..5 The latter provisions impose fines on tax return preparers
who advance tax return positions having no realistic possibility of
success in litigation on the merits. 6 Violation of the rules in Circular 230
could result in suspension or disbarment from practice before the
Service 7 and potentially disciplinary action by the state bar.8 The
* L.L.M., 1993, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia; J.D., 1992, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks. North Dakota (with distinction); B.S.,
1988, Minot State University, Minot, North Dakota (cum laude); Associate with Nelson, Schubert &
McKechnie, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota.
1. E.g., N.D. PRoc. RuTEs FOR LAwYER DISAalUTY AND DiSCPtNE 1.2(A) reprinted in N.D. CEtr.
CODE CouRT RuLES ANN. 1009, at 1013 (1994) [hereinafter LAWYER DisCIPUNE].
2. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1993); Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979).
3. Treasury Dep't. Circular No. 230. 1985-2 C.B. 742 (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1993)).
4. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1994)) (providing the 1994 revisions
to Circular 230).
5. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (Supp. 1993) (providing current penalty rules for return preparers)
with 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994). The new standards in Circular 230 also apply to certified public
accountants, enrolled agents and enrolled actuaries. See 59 Fed Reg. 31,523 (1994).
6. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6694(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993). A return position has a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits if it has an approximate one in three chance of success if litigated, a standard
measured by the existence of substantial legal authority in support of the return position. See infra note
25 (discussing the realistic possibility of success standard).
7. See31 C.F.R. §§ 10.50-.52 (1993).
8. See generally LAWYER DiSCIPuNE, supra note 1. at 1012.
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following information is intended to inform attorneys who represent
clients before the Service of some of the rules they must follow and what
they can expect if they do not, as well as some of the recent changes in
those rules.
II. REGULATORY GUIDELINES FOR TAX PRACTICE
Attorneys engaging in the practice of tax law, just like all other
attorneys, must abide by the standards of professional responsibility
established by the bar of the state in which they are licensed or admitted
to practice. 9 North Dakota attorneys adhere to the North Dakota Rules
of Professional Conduct.lO The American Bar Association (ABA)
promulgates model rules and issues opinions, both aspirational in nature,
and to the extent a state adopts those rules or opinions they become
additional rules for the attorney to follow.
Attorneys must also abide by the rules of the courts in which they
practice. "1 For example, an attorney who files a refund suit in the United
States Claims Court or one who defends a tax evasion case in federal
district court must follow the rules of conduct prescribed by those
forums. The United States Tax Court, which hears petitions for
redetermination of deficiencies assessed by the Service, holds attorneys
to the standard of conduct prescribed by the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 12
The I.R.C. 13 places further restrictions on the activities of attorneys
who fit the legal definition of income tax return preparers.14  It may
come as a surprise to some attorneys to find that they fall into this
9. Id.
10. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. reprinted in N.D. CENTr. CODE C ouRT RULES ANN. 937
(1994) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT].
11. See, e.g., N.D. CENTr. CODE § 27-13-01 (1991); N.D. RULES oF COURT 11.5. reprinted in N.D.
CENT. CODE COURT RULES ANN. 773, 791 [hereinafter COURT RULES]; LOCAL RULES UNITED STATES
DIST. COURT 2(e)(2) reprinted in N.D. CENT. CODECOURT RULES ANN. 1235. 1240 [hereinafter DiST.
COURT RULES].
12. RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES TAX C OURT 201(a), reprinted in 26
U.S.C. § 7453 (1989) [hereinafter TAX COURT RULES]. In most cases the various rules achieve the
same effect through similar if not identical substantive language. For example, North Dakota Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 prohibits bringing, defending, asserting or controverting any issue in a
proceeding unless the attorney has a non-frivolous basis for doing so, "which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." In the Tax Court, an attorney
must certify by signature on all pleadings that the information in the pleadings is correct and the
pleading "is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law . . . ." TAX COURT RULE 33(b). Violation of the standards required by the
courts can result in disciplinary action to include suspension or disbarment from practice before the
particular court involved. See, e.g., TAX COURT RULE 202.
13. 26 U.S.C. (1994) (containing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code).
14. See I.R.C. § 6694 (1994) (providing for return preparer penalties).
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category even though they have never attempted to complete a tax return
or other IRS form. The I.R.C. defines a return preparer as anyone who,
for compensation, prepares or hires one or more employees to prepare
any income tax return or income tax refund claim. 15 This includes the
preparation of a substantial portion of an income tax return or refund
claim. 16 The regulations define the term even more broadly to include
one who gives advice or information sufficient to make completion of
the return largely a clerical or mechanical matter, even if the person
giving the advice did not physically place any information on the form
or review it after completion.17 The advice rendered must have been for
compensation, however.18
The return preparer penalty provisions call for the assessment of a
$250 penalty against a return preparer who prepares a substantial portion
of an income tax return in which an understatement of tax liability
appears.19 An understatement for this purpose is any understatement of
the net amount of income tax payable or an overstatement of the net
amount of an income tax credit or refund claimed. 20 The I.R.C. also
proscribes willful or reckless conduct resulting in an understatement of
liability21 and carries a potential penalty of $1,000 for such a violation. 22
In addition, a practitioner who aids a client in filing false information
with the Service may face criminal penalties.23
The return preparer penalty provisions require return preparers to
advance only those return positions having a realistic possibility of
success if litigated on the merits. 24 The "realistic possibility" standard is
met if a knowledgeable practitioner, after having examined the relevant
authorities, would conclude that a return position has an approximate
one in three chance of being sustained on its merits. 25
15. Id. § 7701(a)(36)(A) (1994).
16. Id.
17. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) (1994).
18. Id. § 301.7701-15(a)(4).
19. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1994). See, e.g., Goulding v. United States. 957 F.2d 1420. 1423 (7th Cir.
1992) (assessing penalties to the preparer under § 6694(a)).
20. I.R.C. § 6694(e) (1994). The net amount payable is not reduced by carrybacks. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-1(c) (1994). A carryback is a tax attribute, such as a net operating loss deduction, applied to
a tax year prior to the year in which it actually accrued. Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-1 (1994).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Venie, 691 F. Supp. 834, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
22. I.R.C. § 6694(b) (1994).
23. Id. § 7206(2).
24. Id. § 6694(a)(1).
25. The regulations define the realistic possibility of success standard as one which is met 'if a
reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a
person to conclude that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits (realistic possibility standard)." Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1994). To
determine whether one has satisfied the realistic possibility standard requires use of the "substantial
1994] 967
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The Treasury Department regulates the conduct of practitioners
who represent clients in administrative proceedings before agencies of
the department.26 The provisions of Circular 230 regulate practice
before the Service. 27 These regulations guide the conduct of practi-
tioners in a number of different ways to include imposing a standard of
due diligence as to the accuracy of representations made to the Service
and the Department of the Treasury. 28 Stepping over the lines of
propriety drawn in Circular 230 could result in disbarment or suspension
from practice before the Service.29
The standards of practice under the rules of professional responsi-
bility, the rules of the various courts, the return preparer penalty
provisions and Circular 230 are cumulative and not mutually exclusive.
Consequently, the attorney who practices in the area of federal taxation
must wade through an abundant assortment of regulatory restrictions to
ensure compliance before advising or representing a client.
The task may become both easier and more difficult now that the
Treasury Department has revised and amended Circular 230. The new
regulations purport to merge standards governing practice before the
Service with those already in existence for return preparers under section
authority" analysis set forth in the regulations pertaining to the accuracy related penalties. Id.; see also
id. §§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (nature of analysis), (iii) (types of authority). In other words, sufficient
substantial authority must exist to allow the practitioner knowledgeable in tax laws to conclude that the
position has a one in three or better chance of success if litigated. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). For this.
the practitioner must analyze all of the proper authorities and determine that the weight of the
authorities supporting a position is substantial in relation to the weight of the authorities supporting
contrary treatment. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). The weight to be given an authority depends on the
relevance, persuasiveness and type of authority involved in the analysis. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii). For
example, a court case that merely states a conclusion is less persuasive than one which cogently sets
forth the reasoning and the application of the law to the facts. Id. The well-reasoned decision would
carry greater weight in the analysis. Id. Also, a document such as a private letter ruling where
information is necessarily deleted to protect the privacy of the taxpayer requesting the ruling carries
less weight where the information deleted could affect the decision in the ruling. Id. While a
practitioner may refer to many different types of authority in reaching a conclusion, certain types of
authority are given no weight. These include treatises, legal periodicals. legal opinions and opinions
offered by tax professionals. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). The authorities underlying the conclusions
reached in the non-authoritative sources may be used as substantial authority if they qualify as such.
Id. And finally, a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statute may suffice as substantial
authority even if no other types of authority support the position. id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii). Presumably,
if little or no authority exists comparable to the facts of the case in question, a well-reasoned
construction of the applicable statute should suffice as substantial authority provided the weight of the
well-reasoned construction is substantial in relation to any authorities that might support treatment
contrary to that proposed by the position advanced. See id. §§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i), (ii).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 330(1988).
27. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
28. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (1993).
29. 59 Fed. Reg. 31.528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 subpart C, §§ 10.50. 10.52 (1994)).
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6694 of the I.R.C.30 One might question the need for new or additional
regulations imposing similar or identical standards as those already in
existence. Unlike Code section 6694, however, Circular 230 does not
merely impose monetary penalties for infractions. Circular 230 governs
practice before the Service, and a violation of its rules subjects the
violator to potential suspension or disbarment from practice before that
agency. 31 Moreover, the Service refers I.R.C. section 6694 violations to
the Director of Practice for the Internal Revenue Service for possible
additional disciplinary action under the provisions of Circular 230.32
III. CIRCULAR 230: THE REGULATIONS
Congress authorized the Treasury Department to issue regulations
governing the representation of taxpayers before the Internal Revenue
30. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (preamble). Section 10.34 of Circular 230 provides:
[Section] 10.34. Standards for advising with respect to tax return positions and for preparing or signing
returns.
(a) Standard of conduct-(I) Realistic possibility standard. A practitioner may not sign a
return as a preparer if the practitioner determines that the return contains a position that
does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard, unless the position is not frivolous and is
adequately disclosed to the Service. A practitioner may not advise a client to take a
position on a return, or prepare the portion of a return on which a position is taken,
unless-
(i) The practitioner determines that there is a realistic possibility of the position being
sustained on its merits (the "realistic possibility standard"); or
(ii) The position is not frivolous and the practitioner advises the client of any opportunity
to avoid the accuracy-related penalty in section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 by adequately disclosing the position and of the requirements for adequate
disclosure.
Id. Cf. I.R.C. § 6694 (1994). I.R.C. § 6694 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Understatements Due To Unrealistic Positions. -if-
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with respect to any return or
claim for refund is due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits, (2) any person who is an income tax return preparer with
respect to such return or claim knew (or reasonably should have known) of such
position, and (3) such position was not disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)
or was frivolous, such person shall pay a penalty of $250 with respect to such return or
claim unless it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and such
person acted in good faith.
(b) Willful Or Reckless Conduct.-If any part of any understatement of
liability with respect to any return or claim for refund is due-
(1) to a willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax by a
person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to such return or claim, or
(2) to any reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by any
such person, such person shall pay a penalty of $1,000 with respect to such return or
claim. With respect to any return or claim, the amount of the penalty payable by any
person by reason of this subsection shall be reduced by the amount of the penalty paid by
such person by reason of subsection (a).
31. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 subpart C), § 10.50 (1994)).
32. I.R.S. Manual: Preparer/Pronoter/Protester Penalties Handbook § (20)(11)22(l)(b) (1993)
reprinted in 93 TAx NoTEs TODAY 206-12 (October 6, 1993).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Service. 33 The Treasury Department's Circular 230 sets forth practi-
tioner qualifications and prescribes a code of conduct for attorneys,
certified public accounts, enrolled agents and others who practice before
the Service. 34 Over time the rules have undergone the evolutionary
process of amendment and now regulate a variety of conduct ranging
from solicitation of clients35 and negotiation of client tax refund
checks 36 to standards of accuracy in representations made to the
Service. 37
A. PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
The term "practice" encompasses a fairly broad array of activities.
It includes all matters pertaining to representation of clients before the
Service such as appearing on behalf of clients at conferences, hearings,
and meetings, as well as the preparation and filing of necessary
documents and communications with the Service on behalf of clients. 38
Practice involves making a presentation of the type listed above to the
Service on behalf of a client that advances in the manner of an advocate
the client's interests or in some way relates to the client's rights, privileges
or liabilities under the federal tax laws. 39
Some related activities do not constitute practice. A return preparer
may appear as a witness in an I.R.S. proceeding on behalf of a client
without engaging in practice as defined by Circular 230.40 Moreover,
anyone can prepare and sign a tax return, election or claim for refund
without necessarily engaging in practice before the Service. 41 At one
33. Pope v. United States. 599 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979). The Secretary of the Treasury
has specific authority to issue regulations governing practice before the Treasury Department,
including practice before the Internal Revenue Service which is a division of the Treasury
Department. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
34. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31.523 (1994) (to be codified at31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
35. See 31 C.F.R.§ 10.30 (1993).
36. See id. § 10.31.
37. See id. § 10.22.
38. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,526 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 § 10.2(e) (1994)).
39. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 1.0812] (2d ed 1991). A return
preparer not otherwise qualified to practice before the Service may engage in limited practice. 59
Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10. § 10.7(c) (1994)).
40. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.7(c) (1993) (providing for appearance as a witness), amended by 59 Fed.
Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.7(e) (1994)); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 39, at $
1.08121 (citing the Conference and Practice Requirements of the Internal Revenue Service, Treas.
Reg. 601.501(a) (1994)).
41. 31 C.F.R. § 10.7(c) amended by 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §
10.7(e) (1994)); see also SALTZMAN. supra note 39. at 5 1.08121 (citing Treas. Reg. 601.501(a) (1993)).
But see BERNARD WOLFMAN AND JAMES P. HOt.DEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 46 n.4.
(2d ed. 1985) (stating that the preparation of a tax return is presumably a form of practice but not one
which requires qualification as attorney, CPA. or enrolled agent).
970 [VOL. 70:4
1994] PRACTICE BEFORE THE IRS
time the regulations specifically excluded tax return preparation as a
form of practice, but the Treasury Department amended that exclusion
in 1984.42 Now, apparently, when a "practitioner" as defined under
Circular 230 prepares and signs a return, claim or election, the
practitioner is engaging in practice before the Service and must adhere
to the regulations.
43
If any confusion existed as to whether Circular 230 applied to the
attorney-practitioner with regard to the preparation of tax returns, it
should disappear now that the Treasury Department has revised Circular
230. The return preparation and related disciplinary standards of the
new Circular 230 apply without question to practitioners who represent
taxpayers before the Service and to those "who sign or otherwise prepare
returns." 44
B. WHO MAY PRACTICE
Circular 230 regulates practitioner qualification as well as conduct.
The term "practitioners," meaning persons authorized to practice before
the IRS, includes attorneys, 45 certified public accountants, 46 enrolled
agents,47 enrolled actuaries, 48 and applicants for enrolled agent status
granted temporary authority to practice. 49
42. 49 Fed. Reg. 6,722 (1984) (amending 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
43. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (requiring the due diligence standard for attorneys, certified public
accountants and enrolled agents who prepare, approve or file any documents with the Service, or
assist in any of those activities).
44. 57 Fed. Reg. 46, 356 (1992). See also 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994).
45. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (1993).
46. Id. § 10.3(b).
47. Id. § 10.3(c). These regulations do not contain the earlier restriction that prohibited an
attorney or a certified public accountant from becoming or maintaing status as enroled agent. See also
31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3(a), (b) (1993). reprinted in 1985-2 C.B. 743.
48. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(d) (1993).
49. Id. § 10.5(c). The regulations allow for some persons not otherwise qualified to engage in
limited practice before the Service. Id. For instance, one who signs a return as a preparer, and who
appears on behalf of the taxpayer at an audit or other procedure at a level below that of District
Conference with respect to issues arising out of the taxable year for which the person prepared or
signed the return is considered a practitioner for purposes of Circular 230. Id. § 10.7(a)(7). Of
course, the return preparer must have proper authorization from the taxpayer to act in a
representative capacity. Id.; 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, § 10.7(c)(1)
(1994)). The return preparer who wishes to represent the taxpayer may not be currently disbarred or
suspended from practice before the Service or other practice of his profession by any other authority.
31 C.F.R. § 10.7(a)(7) (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, § 10.7(c)(2)(1)
(1994)). Others who may engage in limited practice include a regular full-time employee
representing her employer; a partner representing his partnership; a person representing without
compensation a member of the person's own family; an individual appearing on her own behalf: a
bona fide officer or regular full-time employee appearing on behalf of his corporate employer: and a
trustee on behalf of a trust. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.7(a)(l)-(3) (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified
at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, § 10.7(c)(1)(i)-(v) (1994)).
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Any member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of
any state, commonwealth, the District of Columbia, or any territory or
possession of the United States,50 may represent taxpayer clients in
matters before the Service as long as that attorney is not presently
disbarred or suspended from doing so. 5 1 Circular 230 expands this
restriction to prohibit knowingly and directly or indirectly employing or
accepting assistance from any person presently disbarred or suspended
from practice before the Service. 52 Nor may a practitioner share fees
with or accept employment as an associate, subagent or correspondent
from one under such disbarment or suspension.53  Furthermore,
knowingly aiding and abetting an ineligible person in practicing before
the Service constitutes disreputable conduct which in turn justifies
suspension or disbarment. 54 The Director of Practice may presume a
violation of this rule if the practitioner appearing before the Service
maintains a law partnership with an attorney disbarred under Circular
230.5 5 Former government employees face additional restrictions, 56 and
Circular 230 prohibits a practitioner from accepting assistance from any
former government employee in violation of those restrictions.
57
C. TAX RETURN ADVICE
Section 10.22 of Circular 230 imposes a due diligence standard of
accuracy on practitioners who file returns or prepare or assist in filing
returns. This provision expressly takes attorneys out of the mere
non-practitioner return preparer category of former section 10.7(c) by
enumerating the types of practitioners bound by the due diligence
standard for accuracy. Section 10.22 provides: "Each attorney, certified
public accountant, enrolled agent ... shall exercise due diligence: (a) In
preparing or assisting in the preparation of, approving, and filing
returns, documents, affidavits, and other papers relating to Internal
Revenue Service matters .... ',58 The Secretary of the Treasury may
disbar or suspend any attorney for, among other things, refusal to
comply with the rules and regulations set forth in Circular 230.59
50. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(b) (1993) (defining "attorney').
51. Id. § 10.3(a).
52. Id. § 10.24(a).
53. Id. § 10.24(b).
54. Id. § 10.51(h).
55. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(h) (1993).
56. Id. § 10.26.
57. Id. § 10.24(c).
58. Id. § 10.22 (emphasis added).
59. Id. §§ 10.50. 10.52(a). See Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Consequently, an attorney authorized to practice before the Service who
fails to comply with the due diligence standard in the preparation of a
return faces potential suspension or disbarment from practice before the
Service. 60 Knowingly or recklessly giving a false opinion, or giving an
opinion as a result of gross incompetence constitutes disreputable
conduct 61 and similarly subjects a practitioner to sanctions. 62 This
includes establishing a pattern of providing incompetent opinions on
federal tax law issues. 63
Under the old regulations, it appeared as though the Service would
forgive an occasional mistake, and that the practitioner would escape
sanctions if the advice she gave was only negligently erroneous and not
part of a pattern of bad advice. Perhaps the Service was willing to allow
every attorney one slip-up, much like the old common law rule that
entitled every dog to one bite. However, the Service does not require a
pattern of offending conduct before seeking disciplinary action. The
introduction to the new regulations explains that Circular 230 will not
"countenance improper conduct" and that a practitioner will not be
allowed to violate Circular 230 once with impunity.64
D. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Subparts B and C of Circular 230 set forth standards of conduct
required of practitioners. Some of the more common rules of conduct
require a practitioner to provide information to the Service when
lawfully and properly requested to do so as long as the information
requested is not privileged or the request of doubtful legality. 65 A
practitioner must promptly advise a client of the fact of any errors in or
omissions from any return, affidavit or other document the law requires
the client to file or execute. 66 The due diligence requirement discussed
above also applies to the determination of the correctness of oral and
written representations to the Service 67 and to the client.68 A practitioner
60. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.50, 10.52 (1993).
61. Id. § 10.510).
62. Id. §§ 10.50, 10.52(a).
63. Id. § 10.510).
64. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994).
65. 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (1993).
66. Id. § 10.21.
67. Id. § 10.22(c).
68. Id. § 10.22 (c). Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113, 1117 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing 31
C.F.R. § 10.22(c)).
1994] 973
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must not unreasonably delay the disposition of any matters pending
before the Service. 69
Most of the rules set forth in Circular 230 create little controversy
and essentially follow other rules of professional conduct, such as the
model rules promulgated by the American Bar Association. The
additional rules address the peculiarities of tax practice, and the
practitioner engaging in such matters must become familiar with them to
avoid the potential sanctions that result from violations, however
inadvertent they may be. 70
E. SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT
The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to suspend or disbar
practitioners under certain circumstances. 7 1 For example, the Secretary
may suspend or disbar an attorney for incompetence, for refusal to
comply with the rules of Circular 230, or for disreputable conduct.72
Section 10.51 of Circular 230 cites numerous examples of
disreputable conduct, to include giving false or misleading opinions
either "knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence, or
establishing a pattern of providing incompetent opinions" on tax
issues. 73 The definition of false opinions includes those opinions
reflecting or resulting from (1) a knowing misstatement of law or fact;
(2) asserting a position known to be unwarranted under existing law; (3)
69. 31 C.F.R. § 10.23 (1993). Cf. Tax Court Rule 33(b) (pleadings may not be interposed for any
improper purpose such as unnecessary delay) (codified at 26 C.F.R. ch. 76, § 301.6673-1 (1994)).
Other rules govern various activities of a practitioner such as: serving as a notary public in matters
before the Service in which the practitioner is interested, 31 C.F.R. § 10.27 (1993); representing
conflicting interests, except as allowed after disclosure and consent, id. § 10.29; and providing tax
shelter opinions and offering materials. Id. § 10.33. The regulations also proscribe engaging in
disreputable conduct. Such conduct includes, by way of example, violations of criminal laws under
the tax code or other laws involving dishonesty or breach of trust. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(a) (1993).
Blumenthal, 555 F.2d at 1116. It also includes the submission of false or misleading information to the
Treasury Department in connection with tax matters pending before it, id. § 10.51(b); evasion of tax or
failure to file tax returns, id. § 10.51(d); knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence, giving
a false opinion on questions arising under the federal tax law. Id. § 10.51(j).
70. For example, those who practice before the Service must provide information or testimony to
the Director of Practice regarding another person practicing before the Service in violation of the
rules of Circular 230 unless the information is privileged or the request of doubtful legality. 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.20(b) (1993). Any refusal to provide information or testimony under the exceptions must be
based on reasonable grounds and good faith. Id. § 10.20. Another example is the rule in section 10.31
that prohibits a practitioner from negotiating a client's tax refund check. Id. § 10.31. See also supra
note 69 (discussing various rules governing practitioner conduct).
71. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.50- .52 (1993).
72. Id. § 10.50. See Washburn v. Shapiro, 409 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.Fla. 1976) (disbarring
accountant-practitioner after conviction for willfully preparing a false or fraudulent income tax
return).
73. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(j) (1993).
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counseling or assisting in conduct known to be illegal or fraudulent; (4)
concealment of information legally required to be disclosed; or (5)
conscious disregard of information that would indicate that the material
facts expressed in a tax opinion or offering material are false or
misleading. 74
The term "reckless" connotes an extreme departure from ordinary
care and not just simple or even inexcusable neglect. 75 "Reckless
conduct" involves a "highly unreasonable omission or misrepre-
sentation[.]" 76 This departure from the standards of ordinary care must
have been known or so obvious that a "competent practitioner either
must or should have been aware of it. '"77 "Gross incompetence" reflects
"gross indifference, grossly inadequate preparation under the circum-
stances and a consistent failure to fulfill the obligations to the client."78
New section 10.52(a), like the current regulation, applies the willful
violation standard to all of the regulations in Circular 230.79
The former rules provided for disbarment or suspension of
practitioners who violated the tax shelter rules in Circular 230 if the
violation was willful, reckless or a result of gross incompetence as
defined in Section 10.51(j).80 Section 10.52(b), as revised, maintains the
reckless and gross incompetence standard for tax shelter opinions but
also extends that standard to the new section 10.34 which establishes a
higher standard of accuracy for practitioners who prepare returns or give
advice regarding return positions.SI The price of a violation of these
standards could be suspension or disbarment from practice before the
Service. 82
F. THE PROCEDURE FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Subpart C of Circular 230 provides the disciplinary mechanism for
enforcement of the standards of practice. Section 10.5083 grants the
Secretary of the Treasury authority to suspend or disbar a practitioner
74. Id.
75. Id. The new regulations changed some of the language in section 51(j), but the Service
assures practitioners that the changes are not substantive. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994).
76. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(j) (1993).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 57 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.52(a) (1994)).
80. 31 C.F.R. § 10.52(b) (1993).
81. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994).
82. Id.
83. The Treasury Department modified the language of section 10.50 in the 1994 revisions, but
this modification does not appear to constitute a substantive change in the provision. See 59 Fed. Reg.
31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (1994)).
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for any of the reasons listed therein, including refusal to comply with the
regulations set forth in Circular 230.84 When an officer or employee of
the Service learns or has reason to believe that a practitioner has violated
a provision of Circular 230, that person may file a written complaint to
the Director of Practice.8 5 Any other person with information pertaining
to a potential violation may also make such a report to the Director of
Practice or to any employee of the Service.86
The Director of Practice institutes proceedings against a practitioner
by naming the practitioner as respondent on a complaint filed in the
Director's office.8 7 The Director may grant the suspected violator a
conference, and they may agree upon stipulations to be entered into the
record.8 8 The rules allow a practitioner an opportunity to submit an
offer of voluntary suspension.8 9 Otherwise, the attorney has the right to
a hearing presided over by an administrative law judge.90 If the
administrative law judge orders a period of suspension, the attorney may
not practice before the Service during that period. 91 If the complaint
results in disbarment the practitioner may petition for reinstatement after
a period of five years.92
A practitioner may administratively appeal an adverse decision to
the Secretary of the Treasury93 who will make the final decision of the
agency. 94 If the Secretary affirms the decision of the administrative law
judge, the affected practitioner may appeal the agency decision to the
United States district court and through the federal appellate system if
necessary.95
84. Section 10.52 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations grants additional authority for
the suspension of a practitioner who willfully violates any of those regulations. As a practical matter,
one might encounter difficulty in distinguishing between a refusal to comply as opposed to a willful
failure to comply, but the regulations address both instances if a real distinction exists between the two.
85. 31 C.F.R. § 10.53 (1993). See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Circular 230
complaints and the effect on practitioners).
86. 31 C.F.R. § 10.53 (1993).
87. Id. § 10.54. Sections 10.54 through 10.72 of Circular 230 set forth the procedure for initiating
and conducting the proceedings necessary for investigation and disposition of a complaint against
practitioners. See id. §§ 10.54 - .72.
88. Id. § 10.55(a).
89. Id. § 10.55(b).
90. Id. § 10.65(a).
91. 31 C.F.R. § 10.73 (1993).
92. Id. § 10.75.
93. Id. § 10.71.
94. Id. § 10.72.
95. See Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113. 1116 (2d Cir. 1977) (providing a good description
of the disciplinary process from the administrative level through subsequent appellate proceedings).
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IV. REVISIONS TO CIRCULAR 230
A. DUE DILIGENCE
1. The Old Standard: A Toothy Grin
The old regulations imposed on practitioners a requirement of due
diligence in preparing or assisting in the preparation of income tax
returns and other documents relating to matters involving the Service. 96
This standard required advancing only those return positions that had a
reasonable basis in the law.9 7 The reasonable basis standard eroded over
time to mean that a practitioner could advise practically any return
position as long as it was supported by some colorable claim to
legality.9 8 Some commentators described the due diligence standard as
involving a laughter test: if the practitioner could advance the return
position with a straight face, then the position was supported by a
reasonable basis in the law.99 Thus, advancing return positions that did
not actually fall within the bounds of the law became perfectly
acceptable as long as the practitioner could make some kind of a legal
argument in its favor.
The Service does not perform a complete audit of every tax
return. 100 Instead, tax returns are selected for audit in part based on
96. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (1993). See also 57 Fed Reg 31,523 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
10(1994)).
97. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION 314 (1965)
reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671 (1965). For example, consider the tennis player who sought to deduct the
cost of his tennis clothing as a business expense. Mella v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1216
(1986) (deduction denied). If Ozzie and Harriet could deduct the cost of the casual, every-day
clothes they wore while filming their television show, Nelson v. Commissioner. 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1142
(1966) (deduction allowed), surely the tennis professional would have a reasonable basis to deduct the
cost of his work clothes, in spite of the fact that work clothes suitable for off-duty wear are not
generally deductible. Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467,469 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON FORMAL OPINION 85-352, reprinted in 39 TAX LAW. 635, 639-40 (1986)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
99. See Arthur A. Guthrie, IRS' Shapiro Describes Centerpiece Proposal, Hopes to Complete
Circular 230 Project, 59 TAX NOTES 1225 (1993) (quoting Internal Revenue Service Director of
Practice Leslie S. Shapiro); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Law and Order Comes to "Dodge City":
Treasury's New Return Preparer and IRS Practice Standards, 60 TAx NOrEs 1623, 1625 (1993).
For an example of the reasonable basis standard, see United States v. Yorke, unpublished opinion
(D. Md. July 19, 1976) reprinted in MARVIN J. GARIS Er AL, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD 17 (3d ed.
1992). In Yorke, the government prosecuted the taxpayer for falling to report income in the amount of
$400 per week. Id. The taxpayer's attorney had prepared documents which characterized the
payments as loans subject to forgiveness if the taxpayer realized insufficient income to repay the debt
from capital gains of certain speculative stock purchases. Id. at 18. Although the scheme was
aggressive, to say the least, the court found that the position had a reasonable basis in the law. Id.
100. Saltzman, supra note 39, 5 8.03[l].
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information that suggests the presence of tax deficiencies and in part
through a random selection process sometimes known as the audit
lottery.101 Practitioners exploited the audit lottery process by submitting
the arguably colorable claims, knowing the chances of an audit were
small and the claim would probably escape detection. 102 Even if the
Service discovered and rejected the dubious return position the
practitioner could still avoid the sanctions of Circular 230 as long as the
position advanced had a "reasonable basis."
2. New Standards
When the ABA recognized the ineffectiveness of the reasonable
basis standard, it proposed a heightened standard for tax practitioners in
Opinion 85-352.103 The ABA's recommendation admonished
practitioners to advise only those return positions having "some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated."104 To meet the ABA's
recommended standard, a return position needed approximately a
one-third chance of success if litigated on the merits, 105 a standard
practically identical to the approximate one in three quantification of the
realistic possibility standard in the I.R.C.'s return preparer penalty
provisions that followed in 1989.106
The erosion of the reasonable basis standard and exploitation of the
audit lottery process led the Treasury Department, like the ABA, to
propose new regulations in 1986 which would have held practitioners.to
a higher standard in'administrative practice before the Service.107 The
new regulations never became final, however. In 1989 Congress revised
I.R.C. section 6694 to require higher standards of accuracy for income
tax return preparers. 108 Under the revised I.R.C. section, an income tax
return preparer faces a penalty of $250.00 for advancing a return or
refund claim position which results in an understatement of tax liability
and for which no realistic possibility exists for the position to be
101. Id. 5 8.03[1][b]; GARBIS, ET AL, supra note 99, at 121 ("In practical terms, a taxpayer wins
the audit lottery when his ticket is not pulled from the barrel.").
102. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 98, at 639-40.
103. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMUTTEE ON ETICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry, FORMAL OPINION 352 (1985) reprinted in 39 TAX LAW. 631 (1986) [hereinafter OPINION 85-352].
104. Id.; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 638.
105. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 638-39.
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(a)(1) (1994).
107. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (1986).
108. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-239. § 7732(a), 103 Stat 2106.
2402 (1989).
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sustained on its merits. 109 Congress recognized that not every taxpayer's
situation will fall neatly within existing legal guidelines. Consequently, a
return preparer may still advance a position that fails to meet the realistic
possibility standard provided the position is not frivolous and is
disclosed to the Service. 110 The penalty increases to $1,000 for
understatements of liability due to willful attempts to understate liability
or a reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations."I'
The new statutory standard for return preparers differed from the
Circular 230 revisions proposed in 1986, so in 1992 the Treasury
Department withdrew the proposed regulations and substituted new
ones. 112 The Treasury Department intended to supplement the existing
due diligence standard of section 10.22 with the standard set out under
new section 10.34, which holds practitioners to the same standard of
accuracy required by the return preparer penalty regulations under
I.R.C. section 6694.113 The standard in Section 6694 of the I.R.C. limits
return preparers to advancing only those return positions having a
realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits if litigated, referred
to in the regulations as the "realistic possibility" standard.l14 Section
10.34 of the new practice regulations does the same. 115 To meet the
realistic possibility standard under section 10.34, a return position must
have an approximate one in three or greater chance of success in
litigation on the merits. 116 Just like the corresponding standard under
I.R.C. section 6694, under section 10.34 a return position has the
requisite one in three chance if it is supported by substantial authority. 117
3. More Changes to Come?
While the Treasury Department narrowed the gap between the
standards for return preparers under the I.R.C. and those for practi-
tioners under Circular 230, other disparate standards still exist in tax
practice. For example, in Tax Court litigation a practitioner needs only a
109. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1994). See supra note 25 (discussing the "realistic possibility" standard).
110. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1) (1994).
111. I.R.C. § 6694(b) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(a)(1) (1994).
112. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,359 (1992) (amending 26 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1991)).
113. Id.; 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1); see supra note 25 (discussing the "realistic possibility"
standard).
115. 59 Fed. Reg. 31.523 (1994) (to be codified at 31 CF.R. pt. 10 (1994)) (providing the 1994
revisions to Circular 230).
116. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994) (to be codified at31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1994)) (providing the 1994
revisions to Circular 230).
117. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1994). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
98, at 638-39.
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good faith argument for the application, extension, modification or
reversal of existing law. 118 The "not frivolous" standard required by the
Tax Court seems more subjective and more closely resembles the due
diligence requirement for accuracy in section 10.22. 119 The term "good
faith" injects an element of subjectivity into the Tax Court standard while
the realistic possibility standard purports to be more objective.
The Tax Court standard for litigation differs significantly from the
new regulatory standard for administrative practice before the Service.
Section 10.34 would govern return positions advanced and returns
prepared by practitioners.120 Existing section 10.22 relates to duties and
restrictions pertaining not only to return preparation by a practitioner
but also to matters involving the representation of a taxpayer in
proceedings before the Service based on a return position already
advanced.121 The due diligence standard of section 10.22 will still apply
in "practice" before the Service, such as filing non-return documents and
making oral or written representations to Service personnel.122 One
would assume that a practitioner should still be able to argue for a
certain application of the law under the reasonable basis standard as long
as it has some basis in the law. Yet that seems to be precisely the
problem the Service intended to alleviate. Section 10.34 purports to
eliminate the effects of a vague and abused standard of accuracy, the
reasonable basis standard, but the new regulations leave the reasonable
basis standard intact while adding the realistic possibility standard in the
narrower context of return preparation.
The rules governing the presentation of a case to the Tax Court still
require only a good faith argument for reversal or modification of
existing law. 123 Administrative practice rules should require at least that
much. Perhaps the Treasury Department's regulations should specifi-
cally define the due diligence standard for accuracy in such a way as to
mandate good faith and a truly reasonable basis in much the same way
as the court rules do. Administrative practice requires a considerable
118. TAX COURT RuLEs, supra note 12, Rule 33.
119. See F. Nagle, Practitioners Complain to IRS's Shapiro Over Circular 230 Rules, 93 TAX
NOTES TODAY 30-6 (Feb. 8, 1993). Tax Court Rule 33(b) requires counsel or the party signing the
pleadings to certify that the signer read the pleading, that, to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. TAX COURT RutL.S, supra note 12, Rule 33 (b).
120. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994).
121. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22; 57 Fed. Reg. 46356. See SALTZMAN, supra note 39, at $1.08[2].
122. The new regulations do not affect existing section 10.22 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. See 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (1994).
123. TAX COURT RuTEs. supra note 12, Rule 33(b).
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amount of give and take to resolve cases at the administrative level.
Good faith along with a realistic and reasonable basis should not be too
much to ask for. Eventually, perhaps the Service and the tax bar will
equate practice under section 10.22 with practice in the Tax Court, just
as the regulations now require practitioners to equate the return preparer
standards under Circular 230 with those under I.R.C. section 6694. The
standard for preparing tax returns is higher than the standard for
defending a challenged return position in Tax Court. This seems proper
since the tax return and court litigation serve two different purposes.
One could argue that the good faith standard for Tax Court
pleadings already applies at the administrative practice level since the
administrative record essentially lays the basic foundation for the
proceedings in Tax Court.124 Nevertheless, from a policy standpoint,
supplementing the due diligence requirement with a higher standard for
return positions at the administrative level seems to hold promise of
ensuring greater compliance, an essential element of our voluntary
assessment system.
B. A NEW STANDARD FOR AccuRAcY
The substance of section 10.34(a) closely tracks I.R.C. section 6694
and applies to practitioners who advise clients to take return positions or
who sign or otherwise prepare returns.1 25 Under section 10.34(a), when
a return position fails to satisfy the realistic possibility standard a
practitioner may not sign the return as a preparer, prepare that portion of
the return, or advise the client to take the position.126
An exception exists if the position is not frivolous, that is, not
patently improper, 127 and the practitioner advised the taxpayer to
adequately disclose 1 28 the position to the Service. 129 The language of
the new regulation suggests that a nonsigning return preparer may advise
a client to take a noncomplying return position as long as the position is
not frivolous and the preparer advises the client "of any opportunity to
avoid the accuracy-related penalty of section 6662 of the the [I.R.C.]"
through adequate disclosure. 130 Although this appears to present an
opportunity to circumvent the preparer standards of Circular 230, the
124. See TAX COURT RuLEs, supra note 12, Rules 34(b)(3)-(5).
125. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523-24 (1994).
126. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (1994)).
127. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(4)(ii) (1994)).
128. Disclosure is accomplished by completing and submitting IRS Forms 8275 and 8275-R.
129. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(I)(ii) (1994)).
130. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1)(ii) (1994)).
19941
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
preparer must still comply with I.R.C. section 6694, just as the taxpayer
remains liable for his mistakes under the accuracy related penalty
provisions of I.R.C. section 6662.
The new regulations subject a practitioner to suspension or
disbarment from practice before the Service only if the violation of the
realistic possibility standard was "willful, reckless or a result of gross
incompetence .... 131 The preamble to the proposed rules explained
that if a practitioner acted in good faith and with reasonable cause she
would not be considered to have acted willfully, recklessly or through
gross incompetence.132 The Service has already taken the position that it
will not seek to impose the I.R.C. section 6694(a) penalty as long as the
understatement by the preparer was "due to reasonable cause and the
preparer acted in good faith."133 From all indications the same
"reasonable cause, good faith" exception will apply to the practice
regulations as it applies to the return preparer penalty provisions.134
Although one commentator had recommended that the new rules
expressly incorporate the "reasonable cause and good faith exception,"
the Service declined to do so. 135 The preamble to the final regulations
suggests that the existing standard of discipline necessarily includes a
reasonable cause and good faith exception because reasonable cause and
good faith are inconsistent with willful, reckless, or grossly incompetent
violations of Circular 230.136
Circular 230 does not enumerate factors for the Service to consider
when trying to determine whether good faith and reasonable cause exist.
The return preparer penalty regulations, however, set forth five basic
categories of factors relevant to a good faith reasonable cause analysis:
(1) the nature of the error causing the understatement, (2) the frequency
of errors, (3) the materiality of the errors, (4) the preparer's normal
office practice, and (5) whether the preparer relied on the advice of
another preparer.137 Given the similarity between the return preparer
penalty provisions and section 10.34, and in light of the Service's attempt
to bring uniformity to the standards of tax practice, these factors should
also apply to a good faith reasonable cause analysis under Circular 230.
In his remarks to members of the Washington, D.C. bar, the Director
of Practice of the Internal Revenue Service, Leslie S. Shapiro, said that a
131. 59 Fed. Reg. 31.528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b) (1994)).
132. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,524 (1994).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d) (1994).
134. 59 Fed. Reg. § 31.524 (1994).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(1) - (5) (1994).
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practitioner's conduct would have to be "egregious" before the Service
would consider it a violation of the Circular 230 return preparer
standards. 138 He also commented that in the case of a "close call" the
Service would have to take the position that the proposed realistic
possibility standard had not been met. 139 Presumably, at that point the
Service would analyze the facts and circumstances 1 40 to determine
whether the reasonable cause and good faith exception would apply to
absolve the practitioner.141 If the Service found the exception inappli-
cable, the Director of Practice would most likely institute disciplinary
proceedings.
Some practitioners applauded the Treasury Department's- attempt to
bring uniformity to the standards for preparers and practitioners and to
make them more objective, but at the same time they lamented the
Treasury Department's attempt to establish a precise mathematical
standard.142 While determining precise odds seems impossible, it also
seems unnecessary. The realistic possibility standard does not require
that a return position be a clear cut winner. 143 It merely requires an
approximate one in three chance of success. And in the event of a close
call at which point the Service would deny the existence of a realistic
possibility of success, the new regulations will allow the practitioner to
rely on good faith and reasonable cause to avoid suspension or
disbarment. Practitioners should and no doubt will hold the Service to
its express culpability standard of failure to comply due to willful or
reckless conduct or gross incompetence.144
138. B. Kirchheimer, Senice Official Offers Insight on Amendments to Circular 230,'57 TAX
NOTES 984 (1992).
139. Id. at 984.
140. Id.
141. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (1992).
142. Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Proposed Standards of Practice Rules, 92 Tax Notes
252-23 (Dec. 16, 1992) (providing remarks of Harvey Coustan. Chairman. American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants). The thought of trying to establish a precise mathematical standard calls
to mind an observation the late Justice Thurgood Marshall made in a different context, although his
comments seem to apply in this instance as well: "Condemned to the use of words, we can never
expect mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110
(1972) (addressing void for vagueness arguments in a constitutional challenge to a municipal noise
ordinance).
143. A higher standard exists for return positions on tax shelter items. 26 C.F.R. §§
1.6662-4(g)(1). (4) (1993). A position advanced with regard to a tax shelter requires substantial
authority and a reasonable belief by the taxpayer that at the time the return was filed the position taken
was more likely than not the proper treatment. Id.
144. 59 Fed. Reg. 31.528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b) (1994)).
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C. REPORTING ERRONEOUS INFORMATION AND MISTAKES TO
CLIENTS
Section 10.34(a)(2) requires a practitioner who advises a client to
take a position on a return, prepares a return, or signs a return as a
preparer to tell the client about any penalties reasonably likely to apply
because of the position. 145 The practitioner must also advise the client of
the opportunity to avoid penalties by disclosing the position. 146 The new
regulation applies only to penalties "reasonably likely to apply," so it
appears the practitioner need not educate the client on all potential
penalties, however remotely possible, but merely those that appear
reasonably likely. 147
As with other proposed rules, section 10.34(a) drew criticism when
it was initially proposed. The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants suggested amending the proposed revision to require
practitioners to advise clients of penalties reasonably likely to be asserted
instead of those reasonably likely to apply. 148 One commentator
complained that if adopted the regulation would force practitioners to
"play cops" for the Service. 149
In one respect, the Director of Practice may have offered an
appropriate response to such concerns when he commented, "A sound
tax practice would require a practitioner to advise his client of the risk
and possible results." 150 Without question, attorneys have a duty to
advise their clients of the possible results of their actions, especially if the
actions could lead to penalties, fines or criminal sanctions. 151
But what becomes of the attorney-client privilege and the duty of
confidentiality? If one of the Service's revenue agents asks a taxpayer
whether the taxpayer's adviser informed her of the penalties reasonably
likely to apply and about disclosure, the taxpayer might be put in the
145. Id. § 10.34(a)(2).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. H. Coustan, Comments on Proposed Regulations Regarding Circular 230 submitted to the
Service on November 18. 1992 reprinted in AICPA Supports Expanded Use of Contingent Fees, 92
TAX NoTES TODAY 236-13 (November 18, 1992). Mr. Coustan authored and submitted the comments in
his capacity as Chariman of the Executive Committee of the Tax Division of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. Id.
149. R. Zeidner, Treasury Proposal Would Prohibit Preparers From Advising Clients to Take
Risks, 92 TAX NOTEs TODAY 210-13 (October 19, 1992) (quoting Gerald Portney, Director of Tax
Practice at KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C.).
150. Leslie S. Shapiro. Director of Practice, quoted in Zeidner. supra note 149.
151. See PRoFESONAsLCoNDucr, supra note 10, Rule 1.4 (providing that a lawyer has a duty to
inform the client of all information and explain all matters necessary for the client to make informed
decisions); see also id. Rule 2.1 (providing for the lawyer's duty to render candid advice to the client).
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position of either incriminating herself or incriminating her tax adviser
with her response. 152 Commentators suggested amending the proposed
regulations or taking other measures to preclude this type of unfair
questioning by revenue agents.153
D. REASONABLE INQUIRY REQUIREMENT
Section 10.34(a)(3) generally allows a practitioner giving tax return
advice to a client to rely on information provided by the client without
substantiating the information as long as the practitioner does so in good
faith.154 To be sure, this provision applies to the practitioner who
prepares a return or signs a return as a preparer. If a practitioner knows
or has reason to suspect the information may not be correct, or if it
appears incomplete or inconsistent with other information the practi-
tioner knows of, the regulation imposes a duty on the practitioner to
make a reasonable inquiry into the validity of the information furnished
by the client. 155 This provision seems to require the practitioner to "play
cops" much more than the rule in Section 10.34(a)(2).' 56
Although it may seem like a reasonable requirement, what of the
practitioner in a small community who represents a farmer who
purchases land from another client pursuant to an installment contract?
If the buyer reports a certain amount of interest paid and the seller
reports a different amount of interest received in the same transaction,
the practitioner faces the choice of either violating rules regarding
disclosure and confidentiality or violating the regulations. 157 The
practical answer appears to be that the practitioner would simply
withdraw from the representation altogether, but in a rural state such as
North Dakota that alternative is not as practical as it sounds. An attorney
in a rural community may be the only available lawyer within a
considerable distance. Furthermore, in rural areas attorneys may find it
152. Comments on proposed amendments to Part 10 of Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations
were submitted to the Internal Revenue Service on December 22. 1992 by P. Lewis, C. Roady, R.
DeArment, and W. Wilkins reprinted in D.C. Bar Tax Section Responds to Circular 230 Proposal, 92
TAX N OTES TODAY 259-21 (December 30, 1992). Mr. DeArment and Mr. Wilkins, chairs of the tax
section's Tax Policy Task Force. and Ms. Lewis and Ms. Roady, members of that task force.
co-authored and submitted their comments in their respective capacities. Id.
153. Id.
154. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (to be codified at31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (a)(3) (1994)).
155. Id,
156. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49 (discussing comments of accountants about
section 10.34(a)).
157. See Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Proposed Standards of Practice Rules, 92 TAX
NOTES TODAY 252-23 (December 16, 1992) (providing the comments of Claudia Hill, National
Association of Enrolled Agents).
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difficult to turn away established clients where clients, like members of
the general population, are few and far between.
Other examples also suggest potential problems. What of the client
who once asked the practitioner in a different matter if he should falsify
his court testimony to strengthen his position? Does this suggest the
practitioner should cast a wary glance at all information provided by the
client? Or what if the client had taken some improper deductions in
earlier tax years prior to the practitioner's representation or involvement
in the preparation of the client's return? Must the practitioner substan-
tiate all similar deductions the client currently claims? The language of
the regulation sweeps quite broadly by saying that a "practitioner may
not ignore the implications of information furnished to, or actually
known by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable inquiries if the
information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or
incomplete."1 58
The latter phrase regarding the appearance of the validity of the
information arguably limits these restrictions to information currently
under consideration and relieves the practitioner of considering the
client's past performance or circumstances. But what of the client who is
occasionally less than completely accurate? If the information that the
client submits appears similar to false or erroneous information
submitted in the past, the regulation would seem to impose a duty on the
practitioner to substantiate the current claims. If so, a practitioner who
prepares returns or gives advice on return positions may face a
significantly increased burden and may risk either alienating the client
or violating the substantiation requirements.
E. EXPEDITED SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT
A new section 10.76 added to Circular 230 gives the Director of
Practice authority to expedite the suspension of a practitioner when an
independent authority, such as a state bar board or a court, has already
found that the practitioner engaged in serious misconduct. 159 The
procedures for disbarment or suspension of a practitioner discussed
abovel 60 continue to apply under Circular 230. The new regulation,
section 10.76, allows for expedited suspension of a practitioner whose
158. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,527 (1994) (codified 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(3) (1994)) (emphasis added).
159. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,357 (1992). The 1994 revisions redesignated former section 10.76
as paragraph (d) of section 10.33. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994). The new section 10.76, governing
expedited suspensions, was originally proposed as section 10.53A. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,357 (1992).
160. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
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license to practice law has been suspended or revoked for cause or who
has been convicted of any crime under the Internal Revenue Code, such
as willful failure to file an income tax return, 161 or of any felony under
Title 18 of the United States Code involving dishonesty or a breach of
trust. 162 Loss of a professional license for failure to pay a professional
licensing fee does not constitute cause for expedited suspension.163
The pre-existing regulations already allow for the suspension or
disbarment of a practitioner for a conviction of a tax crime or any other
offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust. 164 Those provisions
do not, however, provide for an expedited suspension based on a
criminal conviction. The new regulations allow the Director, upon
learning of the suspension, disbarment or conviction of a practitioner, to
file a complaint against the practitioner,. giving the practitioner a stated
period of time to file an answer. 165 The Director currently has the
authority to suspend a practitioner served with a complaint if the
practitioner fails to answer the complaint within the allotted time period,
or immediately following the conference if the practitioner named in the
complaint requests one. 166
The new rules regarding expedited suspension of disqualified
practitioners may seem redundant given the fact that a practitioner who
loses her license to practice in her profession no longer satisfies the
requirements for authorization to practice before the Service. 167 Section
10.3(a) authorizes a member in good standing of a state bar to practice
before the Service as long as the attorney is not suspended or disbarred
from such practice.168 A strong point of the new rule, however, seems to
lie in the fact that many attorneys belong to the bars of more than one
161. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(b) (1994)).
162. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(b) (1994)).
163. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(b)(1) (1994)).
164. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(a) (1993). See, e.g., Washburn v. Shapiro. 409 F. Supp. 3 (1976)
(disbarring practitioner from practice before the Service after his conviction for willfully preparing a
false or fraudulent income tax return). The preexisting Circular 230 section 10.51(a) does not limit
suspension or disbarment to convictions under Titles 18 and 26 of the United States Code as the new
regulation does. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(b)(2) (1994).
165. 59 Fed. Reg. 31.528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(c)(1) (1994)). The final
regulation allows a practitioner 30 days to answer the Director's complaint. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528
(1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(d) (1994)).
166. 31 C.F.R. § 10.58(c) (1993).
167. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (1993). Recall that one who simply prepares income tax returns
does not need a license to practice law or accounting. See supra note 42. A suspended or disbarred
attorney may not, however, prepare income tax returns as she did before her suspension or disbarment
if a substantial portion of the attorney's practice had consisted of tax work. In re Larson, 485 N.W.2d
345, 350 (N.D. 1992). The preparation of tax returns under those circumstances would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. Id.
168. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (1993).
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state. An attorney practitioner could be disbarred from practice for
cause in one state and still be a member in good standing (although
probably not for long) of another state's bar. 169 While the attorney
disciplinary board in the second state considers and acts upon the
attorney's disbarment in the first state, the attorney remains free to
practice before the Service by virtue of' her license to practice in the
second state. To the extent this may pose a problem, the new rule
providing for expedited suspension reduces the time period during
which the attorney could practice before the Service after having been
disbarred in the first state but while awaiting disciplinary action in the
second. 170
The pre-existing regulations allow a practitioner charged with
misconduct an opportunity to present her case to an administrative law
judge in a hearingl7' before being suspended or disbarred, whereas the
new expedited suspension procedure merely allows the practitioner an
opportunity for a conference with the Director of Practice prior to
suspension.172 The new rules allow the Director to suspend a practitioner
within forty-four days of service of the complaint upon the respondent
rather than waiting for depositions, a hearing and the decision of the
administrative law judge.173 The practitioner suspended under the
expedited suspension proceedings may still avail herself of the
opportunity for a hearing by an administrative law judge by asking the
Director to issue a complaint pursuant to the procedures under section
10.54.174 The expedited suspension would nevertheless remain in effect
until lifted by the Director of Practice or an administrative law judge.175
The new rules for expedited suspension of a practitioner give the
Director of Practice greater power to regulate who may practice before
the Service, whereas the pre-existing regulations temper the Director's
authority with immediate application of due process safeguards required
by statute. 176 The expedited suspension rules retain the due process
169. See LAwYER DISCIPUNE, supra note 1, Rule 4.4 (reciprocal discipline).
170. Cf. Silverton v. Dep't. of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981) (disbarring
attorney from practice in California but not disbarring from practice before the Service until after the
hearing and decision of the administrative law judge).
171. 31 C.F.R. § 10.65(1993).
172. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 525 (1994) (codified at31 C.F.R. § 10.76(e) (1994)).
173. The respondent has 30 days to respond to the complaint from the date it is served. 59 Fed.
Reg. 31.528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(d) (1994)). The respondent may request a
conference with the Director, and if so, it must be held within 14 days after the deadline for filing the
answer. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(e) (1994)). The Director may
suspend the respondent immediately after the hearing if he finds suspension is warranted. Id.
174. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,528; 31.529 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(g) (1994)).
175. Id. at 31,529 (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.76(0 (1994)).
176. 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (1988). See Washburn v. Shapiro. 409 F. Supp. 3. 10 (1976) (finding that
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safeguards for the protection of the practitioner, while allowing the
Director of Practice to get offenders "off the streets" much more
quickly.177
V. DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR TAXPAYERS AND
RETURN PREPARERS
Although the new regulations bring return preparer-practitioners
closer to a single standard, another disparity in tax return preparation
exists. The law holds taxpayers to one standard of accuracy while return
preparers must abide by a different, higher standard. Section 6662 of
the Internal Revenue Code imposes a twenty per cent penalty on the
underpayment of any tax required to be shown on a return when the
underpayment results from any of the following: negligence; careless,
reckless or intentional disregard of rules and regulations; substantial
understatement of income tax; substantial overstatement of pension
liabilities; or any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understate-
ment. 178 The penalty applicable to substantial valuation misstatements
increases to forty per cent in the case of a "gross" valuation misstatement
as defined in the I.R.C..179 The accuracy-related penalties for substantial
understatement of income tax do not apply when substantial authority
supports the taxpayer's positionl80 or when the taxpayer adequately
discloses the position that results in the understatement and had a
reasonable basis for taking the position. 181 Additionally, a general
exception shields the taxpayer from accuracy related penalties when the
taxpayer acts in good faith and with reasonable cause.18 2
In 1993, Congress slightly upgraded the standard of accuracy for
taxpayers.183 The amendments to section 6662 still left a gap between
the standard of accuracy for a preparer and those an uncounseled
statutory due process requirements were adequate).
177. The Service referred to title 31, section 330(b) of the United States Code for authority that
the final regulation satisfies due process requirements in that it gives the practitioner notice of the
grounds for suspension and an opportunity for a hearing before the Director of Practice before being
suspended. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (1994)).
178. I.R.C. § 6662(b) (1994).
179. Id. § 6662(h).
180. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
181. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).
182. Id. § 6664(c)(1).
183. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312,531, § 13251(a)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (1993)). Prior to the Act, the Code allowed for a reduction in an
understatement of tax equal to the amount attributable to the tax treatment of an item where the
taxpayer adquately disclosed the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment. I.R.C. § 6662
(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (1988). The 1993 amendments created the requirement for disclosed positions to be
supported by a reasonable basis. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. No. 103-66, 107
(stat. 312. 531, § 13251 (a) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (1993)).
19941 989
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
taxpayer must meet. In effect, counseled taxpayers will have a greater
legal obligation than those who do not seek professional advice.
Some practitioners compared the negligence standard of the
accuracy related penalties for taxpayers with the reasonable basis
standard. 184 The recent amendments to Circular 230 constrain
practitioners who prepare returns to the more stringent "realistic
possibility" standard.185 One commentator suggested that the disparity
in the standards may lead to conflicts between the practioner and the
client in which the client insists on measuring the validity of a return
position by the reasonable basis standard while the practitioner must
abide by the one-in-three test of the "reasonable possibility" standard. 186
The client willing to risk negligence penalties has less to lose than the
practioner who would risk imposition of sanctions under Circular 230.
If the client insists on a return position supported merely by reasonable
basis but not by a realistic possibility of success, the practitioner would
have to counsel against it, refuse to prepare that portion of the return
containing the controversial position, and refuse to sign the return as a
preparer.187 Conflicts of this nature may even require the practitioner to
withdraw as counsel.' 8 8 The client would be within his rights to assert a
position supported by mere reasonable basis, but the practitioner, held to
a higher standard, would not be allowed to assist the client in asserting
those rights. It is difficult to imagine another instance in which the client
would be deprived of counsel in such a manner.
One might suggest that the lower standard for taxpayers is justified
by the fact that professional tax advisers are trained in the subject matter
and should be held to a higher standard because of their "expertise."
Nevertheless, our voluntary self-assessment income tax system should
strive to accurately and efficiently collect the correct amount of taxes
due and owing to the government no matter who prepares the return. If
the disparate standards encourage some taxpayers to calculate their tax
liabilities less accurately in their favor, then the voluntary self assessment
system fails. It cannot be administered fairly and impartially because the
conscientious taxpayers who retain the services of professional tax
advisers to calculate their tax liability stand a greater chance of paying
184. F.R. Nagle, Practitioners Complain to IRS's Shapiro Over Circular 230 Rules. 93 TAX NOrEs
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the correct (and in many cases probably higher) amount of taxes while
taxpayers who prepare their own returns have more incentive to be less
accurate in their attempts to pay less taxes.
A fair and impartial tax assessment and collection system should
encourage accuracy by all taxpayers and not just by those who pay a
professional to determine their tax liability. A fair and efficient system
would apply a uniform standard of accuracy to all taxpayers, either
directly or indirectly, by requiring the same degree of accuracy in all tax
returns regardless of who prepares the returns. Until that happens, the
debate will likely continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Few areas of the law change as much and as often as federal
taxation. The standards of tax practice change more slowly but just as
profoundly. Tax practitioners must keep abreast of the rules governing
their practice, not only on the local level but at the federal level as well.
While recent modifications certainly affect the way practitioners
represent clients before the Service, the new revisions to the practice
regulations will bring even greater changes to the relationship between
the practitioner and his client and between the practitioner and the
Service. The changes purport to eliminate one set of problems but
threaten to create new difficulties in the process. To the extent the
revisions in the rules governing tax practice enhance accuracy, fairness
and professionalism they are desirable. To the extent that they create
new problems or aggravate old ones, they are unwelcome wrinkles on the
everchanging face of tax law.
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